The dynamic model presented in this paper intends to account for the evidence, which appears to be particularly significant for Italy, showing that the incidence of tax evasion in a certain region is negatively correlated to the level of social capital existing in the region. Beside including social capital among the determinants of tax evasion, we extend the model so as to incorporate a mechanism whereby a high level of tax evasion depresses the formation of social capital, thus helping to explain how regional differences in the endowment of social capital and in the incidence of tax evasion co-evolve and why they tend to be highly persistent. The model seeks also to capture the fact that in a democracy the political determination necessary to effectively repress tax evasion depends on the voters' propensity toward the phenomenon.
INTRODUCTION
The economic literature on tax evasion can be roughly divided into two main strands: the first follows the neoclassical tradition, namely it is founded on the hypothesis that individual decisions concerning tax compliance are the result of expected utility maximization on the part of perfectly rational agents, 1 while the other is inspired by the idea that the conduct of individuals in these matters is very much influenced by the social environment in which they live, namely by the dominant social norms, cultural values, moral attitudes of their communities. 2 According to the first approach, government activities aimed at preventing and repressing tax evasion can effectively reduce its incidence by increasing the probability of evaders to be detected and the penalty in case of detection, while the second approach is much more skeptical about the long-run results obtainable thanks to these activities, since the latter have no direct impact on the value system affecting individual behavior. 3 The dynamic model presented in this paper tries to capture-in a unified formal setup-some of the basic intuitions characterizing these different paradigms. More precisely, it intends to account for the evidence, which appears to be particularly significant for Italy, showing that the incidence of tax evasion in a certain region is negatively correlated to the level of social capital existing in the region (see Table 1 and Table   2 ). Beside including social capital among the determinants of tax evasion, we extend the model so as to incorporate a mechanism whereby a high level of tax evasion depresses the formation of social capital, thus helping to explain how regional differences in the endowment of social capital and in the incidence of tax evasion co-evolve and why they tend to be highly persistent.
The record of governmental agencies in charge of enforcing tax compliance is generally poor in areas where tax evasion is persistently high. This raises another important issue, which is treated in our model, although is generally neglected by the two above-mentioned approach, namely the fact that in a democracy the political determination necessary to effectively repress tax evasion depends on the voters' propensity toward the phenomenon. Indeed, one should expect that-in areas where a relatively large (small) number of citizens are tax cheaters-the political consensus in favor of tough policies against tax evasion tends to be weak (strong) and short (long) lasting. Consistently with this intuition, our model shows that regions where social capital is relatively low and tax evasion is relatively high can do better in the long run (i.e., they can reach a steady state characterized by a higher level of social capital and a lower level of tax evasion) when tax-enforcement policies are determined at the national level rather than at the regional level. The opposite is true for regions where social capital is relatively high and tax evasion is relatively low.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 contains a preview of the model; section 3 presents the basic model; section 4 endogenizes the dynamics of social capital; section 5 assumes that the parameter determining the government's policy reaction is sensitive to the level of tax evasion; section 6 compares the situation emerging when the tax-enforcement policy is determined at the national level to the situation when it is determined at the regional level; section 7 concludes. 
PREVIEW OF THE MODEL
The general framework that we use to model the dynamics of tax evasion is borrowed from catastrophe theory, where abrupt changes in dynamics occurs when control parameters are smoothly changed. In particular, the formal set-up adopted belongs to the family of the cusp catastrophe models. In our basic dynamic model, the amount of tax evasion characterizing a certain area tends to stabilize-in the absence of any policy action opposing it-at a steady-state level that depends negatively on the stock of social capital (civic norms, public ethics, generalized trust, etc.) existing in the area. Notice that in cases ii) and iii) the economy can be entrapped in the neighborhood of a high-tax evasion steady state. To remove the economy from such a trap, the authorities should undertake an intense taxenforcement activity for a prolonged period of time, until the economy approaches its low-tax-evasion steady state. Once this steady state is reached, the authorities can reduce their intervention keeping their repressive effort at a normal level, that is sufficient to let the economy gravitate close to this stable longterm equilibrium.
The basic model described above is extended so as to endogenize the dynamics of social capital (whose stock is treated as fixed in the basic model), which has a crucial role in conditioning the spontaneous (net of policy intervention) evolution of tax evasion in the economy. Hence, the evolution of social capital is modelled so as to account for some stylized facts emphasized by the literature on the subject: i) the existing stock of social capital has positive effects on the formation of new social capital; ii) social capital decays without new "investment" in social capital, and iii) the existing volume of opportunistic behavior-which is proxied in our model by the level of tax evasion-has negative effects on the formation of new social capital. We check that in this extended model one may have a range of values of the (fixed) policy parameter for which the economy has two saddle-path stable steady states (one characterized by a high stock of social capital associated with a low-tax-evasion level and the other characterized by a low stock of social capital associated with a high tax-evasion level), separated by a stable steady state. Again, if the economy gravitates around a steady state characterized by a relatively low stock of social capital and a relatively high level of tax evasion, and the authorities want to move it toward the "virtuous" steady-state, they should exert an intense and prolonged effort to repress tax evasion until the economy will reach the saddle path leading to this virtuous long-term equilibrium. The general message coming from this extended model is that, when a society tends to be entrapped in a longrun equilibrium where opportunistic behavior is very diffuse and social capital is quite poor, a prolonged period of over-investment in repressive activities (a zero-tolerance strategy) lowering the expected return from opportunistic behavior can be necessary in order to make social capital increase over time. Once that the society's endowment of social capital is richer, the level of opportunistic behavior can be kept low without the need of massive investment in repressive activities. However, one may observe that, in a society where opportunistic behavior is very diffuse, the political consensus for a zero-tolerance strategy might be weak, making more likely that the "bad equilibrium" is perpetuated. We model this intuition in the subsequent section of the paper.
Indeed, another extension of the model amounts to endogenize-together with the dynamics of social capital-also the authorities' policy parameter, so as to capture the intuition that their response to tax evasion tends to become weaker the larger is the fraction of the population consisting of tax cheaters, since under these circumstances a tough policy against tax evasion is less popular and thus less likely to be implemented. The simplest way to model this intuition is to treat the parameter on which depends the authorities' reaction to tax evasion as a variable whose value diminishes when the measure of tax evasion increases. In this extended model, we obtain a unique steady state: the multiplicity of steady states that we observed when social capital adjusts in response to changes in tax evasion is eliminated if the authorities' policy parameter decreases with the increase in tax evasion. Indeed, under these circumstances, at levels of tax evasion higher (lower) than the unique steady-state level, the authorities' effort to fight tax evasion is too weak (strong) to allow these levels of tax evasion to be long-run equilibrium values. In this way, if the steady state at which the economy is stuck is "bad" (i.e., if it displays a high level of tax evasion associated to a low stock of social capital), one cannot expect that the authorities will consistently act for a prolonged period of time in order to move it towards a more virtuous situation. This pessimistic conclusion is better qualified in the last extension of the model, which accounts for the fact that in some countries (like Italy) there are large interregional differences in the endowment of social capital and in tax compliance, while the policy against tax evasion is decided at national level and is unique for the entire country ("one fits all"). In this context, it is reasonable to assume that the authorities' policy parameter reflects the average propensity toward tax evasion of the voters of the entire country, while in different regions the levels of social capital and tax evasion may converge to different steadystate levels. As a consequence, in a region endowed with a relatively large (small) stock of social capital, the policy against tax evasion is less (more) severe if decided nationally than if decided locally. Hence, one should expect that such a region ends up having less (more) social capital and more (less) tax evasion that it would have if the policy reflected only the propensities of the local population.
THE BASIC MODEL
The formal set-up adopted here is an adaptation of the "Street gang" model (Boccara, 2004, pp. 87-91) to the dynamics of tax evasion:
where N • represents a measure of tax evasion at time t 
where r and K are strictly positive constants, and N # is the (exogenously given) initial value of N • . Notice that, in the absence of any policy action aimed at opposing tax evasion, the latter tends to stabilize at the level N ) =K. One may think that K depends negatively on the amount of social capital (civic norms, public ethics, generalized trust, etc.) existing in the society.
The policy function ••N • • is given by
where a, b and ξ are strictly positive constants. Notice that the effort to fight tax evasion increases with the level of tax evasion according to the parameter a, which is controlled by the authorities: a higher a means that for any level of tax evasion the authorities devote more efforts to reduce tax evasion. 
The steady-state values (fixed points) of n are the solutions to:
The equation of the boundary between the domains in the parameter space in which (4) has either one or three fixed points can be found by solving the system consisting of (5) and 
The parametric equation of the boundary is thus
Therefore, one can have three possible cases.
In the first case, there is a unique and stable steady state characterized by a low level of tax evasion. In the second case, there are two stable steady states, one characterized by a low and the other by a high level of tax evasion, with an unstable steady state in between the two stable ones. In the third case, there is a unique steady state characterized by a high tax-evasion level. 
Notice that three values of n solve the equation above. Moreover, one can check that n' and n''' are locally stable, and that n'' is locally unstable (see Figure 2) : Finally, let us assume that • • =0.05=β, ξ=1 and α=0.1. In this case, at steady state one has:
To check that • J is locally stable, one can compute (see Figure 3 ): Furthermore, it is worth to notice that i) the three cases analyzed above differ only with respect to the value of α, namely only because of the different strength through which the authorities react to tax evasion, and ii) in cases 2 and 3 the economy can be entrapped in the neighborhood of a high-tax evasion steady state. To remove the economy from such a trap, the authorities can keep α high, namely they can undertake a high level of tax-enforcement activity, until the economy approaches its low-tax-evasion steady state. Once this steady state is reached, the authorities can reduce their intervention since the economy will remain close to it, which is stable.
ENDOGENIZING THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
An interesting extension of the model amounts to endogenize the dynamics of K, which has a crucial role in conditioning the spontaneous (net of policy intervention) evolution of tax evasion in a society. It is assumed that Kt is linked to St, i.e. the stock of social capital existing in the economy at time t, by the following relation:
In its turn, the evolution of St is such that i) the existing stock of social capital has positive effects on the formation of new social capital; ii) social capital decays without new "investment" in social capital, and iii) the existing volume of opportunistic behavior-which is proxied by the level of tax evasion-has negative effects on the formation of new social capital. Consistently, one can model the dynamics of St according to
where γ is a parameter determining the productivity of the existing stock of capital in the formation of new capital, is an elasticity parameter and ! is the social capital depreciation rate.
The dynamics of tax evasion is now governed by
where *&N # ' is given by (3) The economy evolves in time according to the system of differential equations (8)- (9). The fixed points (steady states) (S, N) can be found by setting S " # $ 0 in equation (8) 
Again, one may have parameter values for which the system has only one steady state and parameter values for which the system displays three steady states. We focus here on the case in which the system has three steady states.
Case with two saddle-path stable steady states (one characterized by a high stock of social capital associated with a low-tax-evasion level and the other characterized by a low stock of social capital associated with a high tax-evasion level), separated by a stable steady state Let us assume that D=0.025708814682, a= ξ=1, b=9.724291185, r=0.0939849624, σ=0.5, γ=0.01, δ=0.1. Given these parameter values, equation (11) 
where the μs are the eigenvalues of the system and all derivatives are evaluated at steady state.
Evaluated at (S'=29.738547058, N'=0.0183375), equation (12) Considering the signs of the two eigenvalues and the fact that the system has only one initial condition (S0 is given), one can conclude that in a neighborhood of (S', N') the system is saddle-path stable.
Evaluated at (S''=0.25, N''=0.2), equation (12) Considering the signs of the two eigenvalues, one can conclude that in a neighborhood of (S'', N'') the system is stable.
Finally, evaluated at (S'''=0.0215209, N'''=0.681662), equation (12) Considering the signs of the two eigenvalues and the fact that the system has only one initial condition (S0 is given), one can conclude that in a neighborhood of (S''', N''') the system is saddle-path stable.
Notice that in the case analyzed above it is likely that -no matter what the initial condition S0 may bethe economy ends up gravitating around (S'', N''), that is the steady state characterized by intermediate values of S and N, since (S'', N'') is an attractor. If the authorities want to move the economy from (S'', N'') towards the virtuous steady state (S', N') characterized by a high stock of social capital and a low level of tax evasion, they should invest large resources in the repression of tax evasion (they should set a>1) for a sufficiently long period of time, until the economy will reach the saddle path leading to (S', N'). From that instant on, in the absence of shocks, the authorities can keep a=1 forever, thus letting the economy converge to (S', N').
Therefore, the general message coming from the extended model is that, when a society tends to be entrapped in a long-run equilibrium where opportunistic behavior is very diffuse and social capital is quite poor, a prolonged period of over-investment in repressive activities (a zero-tolerance strategy) lowering the expected return from opportunistic behavior can be necessary in order to make social capital increase over time. Once that the society's endowment of social capital is richer, the level of opportunistic behavior can be kept low without the need of massive investment in repressive activities. However, one may observe that, in a society where opportunistic behavior is very diffuse, the political consensus for a zero-tolerance strategy might be weak, making more likely that the "bad equilibrium" is perpetuated. We model this intuition in the next subsection.
ENDOGENIZING THE DYNAMICS OF THE POLICY FUNCTION'S PARAMETER
The political economy of tax evasion may suggest that the authorities response to such a phenomenon tends to become weaker when more people is involved in this kind of behavior, since under these circumstances a tough policy against tax evaders is less popular and thus less likely to be implemented.
To capture this intuition, we treat the parameter on which depends the authorities' reaction to tax evasion, namely a, as a variable whose value diminishes when the measure of tax evasion increases:
where H and L are strictly positive constants.
Given (13), equation (9) can be rewritten as
Now, the economy is governed by the differential equations (8) and (14). At steady state, (14) can be written as
Solving again the model for ξ=1 and σ=0.5, equation (15) By linearizing the system consisting of (8) and (14) around "S°• 0.0215209, N°• 0.681662#, one can obtain the characteristic equation of the linearized system:
Considering the parameter values, equation (17) Considering the signs of the two eigenvalues and the fact that the system has only one initial condition (S0 is given), one can conclude that in a neighborhood of (S°, N°) the system is saddle-path stable.
Notice that by endogenizing the authorities' policy parameter, we obtain a unique steady state: the multiplicity of steady states that we observed when social capital adjusts in response to changes in tax evasion is eliminated if the authorities' policy parameter decreases with the increase in tax evasion.
Indeed, under these circumstances, at levels of tax evasion higher (lower) than the unique steady-state level, the authorities' effort to fight tax evasion is too weak (strong) to allow these levels of N to be longrun equilibrium values. In this way, if the economy is stuck in a "bad" (high tax evasion associated to low social capital) steady state, one cannot expect that the authorities will consistently act so as to move it towards a more virtuous situation.
REGIONAL VERSUS NATIONAL POLICY AGAINST TAX EVASION
Assume that each of the J regional economies making up the national economy has its own endowment of social capital Sjt, whose motion is governed by 
where @ j , E j and B j are the parameters on which depends the dynamics of social capital in region j.
The regional dynamics of tax evasion is governed by
( , Nj0 given, j=1,…,J.
If the regional policy against tax evasion responded only to local conditions, one could argue thatconsistently with (13)-the policy parameter ajt would be determined in each region according to
In contrast, if the policy against tax evasion is decided at national level and is unique for the entire country ("one fits all"), it is reasonable to assume that in each t the authorities' policy parameter reflects a weighted average of the propensity toward tax evasion of the voters of the different regions:
where wj is the weight of region j in the authority's policy function.
To see the implications of having a centralized policy against tax evasion (rather than policies decided at the regional level) in the presence of structural differences across regions in the formation of social capital, let J=2, H=1, L=109.00128, D=0.025708814682, ξ=1, b=9.724291185, r=0.0939849624, σ1= σ2=0.5, w1= w2=0.5, γ1=0.01, δ1=0.1, γ2=0.0095, δ2=0.1081534. In this numerical example, one has 2 regions whose weight in the national authority's policy function is the same (w1= w2=0.5). However, notice that in region 1 the existing stock of social capital is more capable of generating new social capital and less subject to erosion than in region 2 (γ1>γ2, δ1<δ2).
Given the comparative advantage of region 1 in the process of formation of social capital, one can check that if the policy against tax evasion were decided locally, i.e. according to (20) , one could have in the long run less tax evasion and more social capital in region 1 than in region 2:, where "°" denotes the steady-state value of a variable when the policy parameter were determined according to (20) (i.e., when the policy were decentralized at regional level). Not surprisingly, one would have in the long run a larger stock of social capital in region 1 than in region 2:
In the case in which the policy against tax evasion is determined at national level, one has:
, where "*" denotes the steady-state value of a variable when the policy parameter were determined according to (21) . Notice than in region 1 (the more virtuous region) the steady-state level of tax evasion is higher when policy is determined at national level ( 
CONCLUSIONS
In the model presented in this paper we have introduced mechanisms linking tax evasion to social capital and governing the accumulation and depreciation of social capital. In this context, a high degree of persistence can be generated, i.e., temporary shocks may have long-lasting effects on social capital and on the diffusion of opportunistic behavior such as tax cheating. In particular, policy shocks may move the economy from a long-term equilibrium to another: especially when a society is entrapped in a longrun equilibrium where opportunistic behavior is very diffuse and social capital is quite poor, a period of over-investment in repressive activities (a zero-tolerance strategy) lowering the expected return from opportunistic behavior can be necessary in order to make social capital increase over time. In general, a special attention should be dedicated to design policies that may favor the formation and preservation of social capital, thus "avoiding policies that, while producing short term benefits, undermine civic capital, with negative long term effects. For example, a tax pardon, which grants immunity for past tax evasions in exchange for a small fee, can be a very smart fiscal policy in the short term, since it will increase tax revenues without increasing the marginal tax rates, but it might deteriorate the stock of civic capital of a nation, with very negative long term consequences" (Guiso et al., p. 48) . However, the model presented here accounts also for the fact that when opportunistic behavior is very diffuse, the political consensus for tax enforcement tends to be weak, thus loosening the policy response that would be necessary for reducing tax evasion and fostering social capital. This implies that, in the presence of substantial regional differences in the endowment of social capital and incidence of tax evasion, the fact that tax-enforcement policies are determined at the national level may improve the situation of those regions where social capital is lower and tax evasion is more diffuse, but at the cost of reducing the long-run level of social capital and increasing the long-run level of tax evasion in the more virtuous regions. The general message here is that policy responses are not independent of the civic values and social norms prevailing in a society, and that therefore the level at which policy decisions are made can only partially solve the conundrum arising from the close link that connects the dominant culture of a society to the quality of its institutions and policies.
